This chapter aims to analyze Brazil's regional policy towards South America during Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva's government by discussing what kind of leadership the country was able to perform in the region during this time. The authors examine the role played by the policy of International Cooperation for Development on such regional leadership. Our central argument is that although Brazil has performed the role of a regional leader, there is a need for distinguishing leadership for regional matters -inwards regional leadership -from leadership for global issues -outwards regional leadership. We argue that inwards regional leadership was in fact successfully performed by Brazil in South America, mainly due to its role as a Development Regional Leader. On the other hand, we also verified that such leadership for regional matters did not always allow Brazil to act on behalf of the entire region on the global arena. Nevertheless, we argue that Brazilian diplomacy left behind the belief that, in order to have global protagonism, the country should use South America as a regional launching platform. Instead, Brazil has been making use of global coalitions such as IBSA and BRICS to boost its global role.
I. Introduction
In the Brazilian Foreign Policy literature, the reference to the Brazilian pursuit of an important international role is not new. Indeed, this is one of the most recurrent aspects ascribed to the Brazilian diplomacy (Lima 2005b; Silva 1995) . Another everpresent feature regarding Brazil´s stance on the international scenario is its alleged drive for playing a leading role in the regional arena (Saraiva 2010; Silva 1995) . This is also true as far as official statements are concerned. To give a recent example, former president Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva said before Itaipu Hydroelectric Board of Directors that there was a claim from the South American countries for Brazil to lead them 1 . Likewise, it is worth mentioning the critiques voiced by former minister of Foreign Affairs Luiz Felipe Lampreia (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) , saying that leadership was something to put in practice, not to be heralded. Moreover, he claimed, leadership should be a continuous and consistent attitude 2 .
In our view, both the aims of having a more important international role and of exercising regional leadership are still very much present in the Brazilian foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless recent changes on the Brazilian stance towards South America (Hirst & Lima 2006; Hirst, Lima & Pinheiro 2011; Pecequilo & Carmo 2012; Saraiva 2010; Spektor 2010) should be taken into account in order to better evaluate each one of those aims, as well as their alleged connection, that is, the hypothesis that being a regional leader is a pre-requisite for having international protagonism. We argue that during Lula's government (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) the Brazilian policy of horizontal cooperation for development strongly contributed to strengthen to Brazil's regional leadership as well as to diminish -if not totally extinguish -the instrumental nature of the latter to achieve global protagonism 3 .
This chapter joins the debate about Brazilian regional performance by starting with the question of what kind of leadership Brazil has played -if the country has indeed played such a role -and in which areas. Our main hypothesis is that one should distinguish between two different kinds of leadership: inwards regional leadership; and outwards regional leadership. Whilst the former is defined as the willingness and the capacity to set formal or informal rules and patterns of behavior within the regional sphere; the latter is defined as the willingness and the capacity to lead regional partners in global matters. In this sense, the thesis that Brazil was likely to consolidate itself as a middle global power before gaining acceptance as a leader in its region (Malamud 2011) should be slightly revised. Although we follow the argument that "leading a region is not a precondition for global emergence" (Idem, p. 4), we argue, instead, that
Brazil does play the role of a regional leader. In saying so, we contend that in particular issue areas Brazil fulfills the three necessary conditions that, according to Van
Langenhove and Zwartjes (see Chapter 1) qualify it to play an inwards leading role in South America: (i) the willingness to act as a leader; (ii) the leadership capacity; and, finally (iii) the acceptance of this kink of leadership by other actors. Finally, we argue that, although it is not necessary to be a representative of its own region to play a relevant role in the international scene, Brazilian global protagonism is reinforced by its role as a Development Regional Leader.
To present our argument, we have organized this chapter in three sections. First we briefly discuss distinct views of Brazil's regional leadership -or its lack -followed by our quest for a different approach to characterize leadership. Second, we address what kind of leadership Brazil has played in South America by means of implementing projects for development of two different types: credit lines for infrastructure projects 4 and technical cooperation for social development policies. Altogether, these initiatives are strong indicators of Brazil's position as an inwards regional leader -a Development Regional Leader, a label that captures and summarizes Brazil´s willingness and capacity, as well as the acceptance from its regional neighbors of Brazilian initiatives 4 It is important to underline that we are talking about public financing for foreign governments to purchase goods and services from Brazilian construction and engineering companies related to infrastructure projects that South American countries consider being relevant to their development. We are not interested in discussing the broader phenomenon of the expansion of Brazilian capital, a strategy that, though may also benefit from public finance support, does not necessarily aim to generate regional public goods such as infrastructure. For a discussion of the latter and its effects on national development see Masiero & Caseiro 2012 ; for the international expansion of Brazilian capital, see Actis 2012 and for boosting economic and social development in the region. In the third section, we turn to the place IBSA Dialogue Forum 5 has occupied on Brazilian foreign policy during Lula´s government and to its connection -if any -with Brazil's regional leadership as defined earlier. By way of conclusion, we raise some ideas about the complementarity, though not dependence, between Brazilian regional leadership and Brazilian global protagonism.
II. To be or not to be a regional leader
The need for more precise categories is a central question for scholars and practitioners trying to qualify and rank countries in the international system. This is particularly more complicated when we talk about volatile attributes or situations.
Leadership and power, for instance, are not static features. It is impossible to ascribe to anybody or to any country a kind of everlasting leadership position or major power situation. Those are relational and historically contingent categories, and therefore they are not only associated with the country´s own capabilities and behavior -which are not static either -but also to other countries' capabilities and behavior, and consequently to the current configuration of the international system. In face of the identification of a power shift in global politics from the G7 to a group of emerging powers (Hurrell 2000) , this debate seems to have become even more intense.
It is very much due to the difficulties around the definition of those categories that authors from different perspectives have been trying either to rank or to label countries´ power -great power, middle power, intermediate power, emerging power, global power, regional power -as well as to label different kinds of leadershipmultiple, collaborative, shared, distributive, by concertation 6 . By doin,g so they attempt
5 From the outset, it is important to note that, although Brazil participates in other political coalitions with emerging countries and middle powers, such as the BRICS -Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa -and is even currently investing much more politically in the latter than in IBSA, the option to examine the place of the latter coalition in Brazil's foreign policy and its relation to the issue of its alleged regional leadership agenda (instead of the BRICS) was due to the fact that the article examines in particular the period of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's government (2002 Silva's government ( -2010 , while the BRICS group was only formalized in the first presidential summit in 2009, that is, at the end of his second term 6 "El desafío de definir el rol como potencia global" by Juan Gabriel Tokatlian. La Nacion, 6 November 2010. Available at: < http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1321624-el-desafio-de-definir-el-rol-como-potenciaglobal>. Accessed: 2 May 2012.
to simultaneously take into account some of the particularities of each country and to avoid excessively detailed classifications. The bad news is that either we have dozens of different -and sometimes useless -typologies or, rather, we surpass actual and relevant singularities in the name of parsimony.
Notwithstanding the acknowledgment of the relevance as well as the complexity of the attempts to conceptualize power, it is not our aim to propose a new definition or alternative criteria to categorize it. Instead, we have decided to join the debate about different kinds of leadership, due to the importance of this category for South American current international politics. Therefore, we see leadership as a position created and nurtured both by those who present themselves as leaders, and by those within the same region and/or from abroad, who reinforce, through statements or actions the leading position of a country. Additionally, we argue that, when it comes to leadership, we have to think not only about who exercise it, but also about on which issues it is exercised.
As a volatile, and not structural, feature, a leading role has to be continuously renewed in order to be recognized as such. Indeed, when it comes to regional leadership we see it as an ongoing process which can always be disputed by regional neighborsin the South American case, usually by Brazil, Argentina and, more recently, Venezuela (Flemes & Wojczewski 2010) . Therefore, we are not facing a Shakespearean dilemma of "to be or not to be" a leader; but rather a kind of Pirandelian puzzle of "So It Is (If
The main difference is in the way Brazil sees itself as a regional leader and the way it is seen as a leader by its peers, independently of the means through which this recognition is achieved and renewed.
Most authors agree with the idea that Brazil was not in a position that could lead to any easy or automatic acknowledgement of the country's regional leadership in world affairs (Lima & Hirst 2006 ); or of a consolidated regional leadership (Vieira 2011) ; or even of a regional leading role at all (Hirst 2010 ).
According to Andrés Malamud, who has been giving close attention to this subject, leadership can be defined as "the capacity to engage subordinate states so that they adopt the goals of the leading state as their own" (2010, p.3, our emphasis). Unlike
Malamud, we do not refer to leadership in such a way, since we understand the idea of subordinate states adopting the goals of another state as their own as an example of dominance, rather than of leadership 7 . In fact, the idea of subordination seems to detract 7 In saying so, we are implicitly denying Kindleberger's (1981) definition and distinction between the concepts of dominance and leadership. Whilst for him "one country…dominated another when the other or even to ignore a certain level of complementarity of interests and freewill, which can be identified in the case of Brazil and its neighbors. Indeed, we argue that the kind of regional leadership Brazil has performed during the Lula´s government should be seen as associated to its capacity to be a referential country for development policies, not only because it was able to take more than 30 million people out of the poverty in less than one decade (World Bank, apud Stolte, 2012, p.13) , but also because it put in place a type of cooperation for development which served, even if asymmetrically, the actual interests of the South American countries, including Brazil. Indeed, as stated by Dauvergene and Farias, "Brazil has moved beyond the 'traditional' role of calling for development to being in a position to draw on its own experience to offer development solutions" (2012, p. 909), thanks to the fact that both the relative paucity of resources for Brazil to assume the role of paymaster and therefore to absorb the costs of region building and the lack of will to do so (Burges 2005 (Burges , 2007 (Burges , 2008 ) now belong to the past (Saraiva 2010 ).
Malamud also defines leadership as "the capacity to influence followers" (2010, p. 13). Even if we acknowledge that influence is a very difficult attribute to measure, this idea could help us to better understand the kind of leadership Brazil has actually played in the region. Even so, we should make a distinction between "the capacity to influence followers" (Idem) in regional matters and in global matters. In the case analysed here, we witness a kind of leadership that can neither be extended to all issue areas, nor qualify the leading country to claim the right and legitimacy to represent its neighbors in global issues. In sum we are not talking about a kind of comprehensive leadership or structural leadership, that is, the one that could cover all dimensions of a country's interests irrespective of the forum of discussion. In fact, we argue that this kind of leadership no longer exists (not even great powers can benefit from this kind of leadership). On the contrary, we have opted for examining only one dimension of Brazilian performance in the region, one that can be seen as an example of a kind of leadership.
Now we turn to the concept of consensual hegemony, as crafted by Burges (2008) in his attempt to explain the leadership strategy of an emerging power like Brazil had to take into account what the first entity did, but the first could equally ignore the second." (Kindleberger 1981, p. 243) ; and leadership is a situation when a country persuades "others to follow a given course of action which might not be in the follower's short-run interest if it were truly independent." (Ibidem); for us, such definitions of dominance and leadership do not take into account a certain level of complementarity of interests and freewill between leaders and supporters.
-a strategy, he concludes, in which Brazil has not succeeded. (Idem, p. 66) . This concept was meant to substitute the somewhat worn out concept of leadership, as well as to be a tool to explain a kind of strategy that even if it fails to reach its objective, nevertheless "offers rewards that compensate for a failure to attain it" (Idem, p. 66).
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On the other hand, the concept of consensual hegemony proposed by Burges focuses "on a Gramsci-inspired vision that privileges the creation of consensus through the constructive inclusion of potentially competing priorities and the shaping of common positive outcomes" (Idem, p. 81). Having reviewed these contributions that scrutinize the concept of leadership for explaining the situation in South America which have greatly helped us to refine our own view on the subject, we will now present our understanding of Brazilian regional leadership and some examples to illustrate it. 8 According to Burges, when the strategy fails "it demonstrates that the very attempt to form a consensual hegemony offers the leading state gains that can compensate for an ultimate failure in the larger project; the non-dominating nature of consensual hegemony allows for a series of shifts in the nature of regional relations that at least partially embeds the leading state's interests." (Burges 2008, p. 66) 9 In his own words, "The dominant group will go to the extent of making minor or tangential sacrifices, even in the economic realm, in order to co-opt the subordinate, creating a system of political economy which subtly, yet indelibly, commits the subaltern to preserving the hegemony for what at first glance may appear self-interested reasons" (Burges 2008, p. 71) .
III. Cooperation for Development and Brazilian Regional Leadership
Brazilian Cooperation Agency (BCA) -the official agency in charge of coordinating Brazilian policy of international cooperation -defines SSC as mainly technical cooperation, based on the commitment to the construction of capacities for sustainable development, by means of integrating the human resources formation, organizational strengthening, institutional development, and the provision of public goods (Cintra 2011) . Moreover, BCA excludes financial transfers such as the ones performed by the BNDES (National Bank for Economic and Social Development) to other developing countries out of its definition. In this sense, SSC for development
should not be seen as the same of SS relations in general, although "for Brazil [they] have become intertwined dimensions in its foreign affairs", as posited by Hirst (2011, p. 5 ). According to some scholars, Brazilian SSC for development is characterized by certain singularities, since the country perceives it as:
"(A)n institutionally grounded action built upon the capabilities of its state agencies comprising technical assistance, skills transference and capacity building. It is centered upon the notion of inter-state partnership, based on ideals of solidarity, the relevance of shared experiences and the value of exchanging capabilities to overcome the social and economic limitations imposed by underdevelopment" (Idem, p. 4).
By a different token, we could take into account the study by Lengyel and Malacalza (2011) , who have written a very interesting essay on the variety of instruments and forms through which this kind of cooperation can manifest itself. In their view, SSC can include not only non-refundable loans but also refundable financing, considering Government Sponsored Investments (GSI) as a modality of SSC.
According to them, GSI are:
"Investments sponsored/financed by governments and secured by bilateral agreements favorable to receptor countries, which do not impose real financial risks to the enterprises involved (…) and imply a relevant economic disbursement envisaging vital areas of development in the receptor countries." (Lengyel & Malacalza 2011, p.11) According to Lengyel & Malacalza (2011) , then, we could indeed take -though not without consequences -the credit lines for infrastructure projects in South America together with technical cooperation projects for social development sponsored by Brazil as examples of SSC. More specifically, BNDES credit lines for boosting South
American countries' infrastructure could be seen as a kind of SSC, an example of GSI modality, since:
1. It provides "a relevant economic disbursement envisaging vital areas of development in the receptor countries"; 2. It is "favorable to receptor countries" by presenting lower interest rates and varied means of payment;
3. It also reduces expressively the "real risks to the enterprises involved"
by reducing the risks of default.
Not being the objective of this article to engage in a conceptual debate about SSC, though, we decided to label the policy Brazil has implemented towards its South
American neighbors mostly during the Lula government as regional cooperation for development (both of technical and economic nature, excepting those initiatives involving military equipment of any kind). In so doing, our aim was to get away both from the Brazilian official statements, which at times contradict the governmental practices, and from any other definitions which unwittingly succumb to the latter; we also wanted to avoid embracing definitions that could immerse ourselves in endless political contentions, without furthering the exam of Brazilian regional leadership, which is the core of this chapter. Table I ), to the extent that at least 35% of the amount disbursed for each project was spent on imports of Brazilian products (Masiero & Caseiro 2012, p. 16) . Data collected by Masiero and Caseiro (2012, p. 16 ) also shows that between 2008 and 2011, US$ 5.2 billion out of the US$ 9.9 billion BNDES lent to foreign governments and corporations for the procurement of goods and services of Brazilian companies went to Latin American countries. Moreover, it is worth noting that the Brazilian government employed large amounts of subsidies when financing such loans, since the national Treasure captured resources in the financial market under an interest rate of 11.7%, and BNDES lent it under a rate of only 6%. In this sense, the bank made the loans cheaper for its contractors, which was allowed by Brazilian government fundamental part of economic growth. The State is understood, in this sense, as "capable of regulating the market to ensure a macroeconomic stability broader than monetary stability and, simultaneously, strengthen the market as the main producer of wealth." (Morais & Saad Filho, 2011, p . 525, our translation). 11 Brazil is responsible for depositing 70% out of the total, Argentina 27%, Uruguay 2%, and Paraguay 1%. Inversely, Brazil and Argentina are allowed to withdraw just 10% out of the fund, Uruguay 32%, and Paraguay 48%. Although it would not be correct to say that Brazilian commitment to FOCEM is devoid of interests, it does represent a dramatic change in the Brazilian stance towards the region, as long as it has materialized the country´s decision to pay for the most part of the costs of this regional integration arrangement. subsidies (Leopoldo 2011) . Additionally, BNDES's loans were supported by regional payment mechanisms 13 that aim to reduce the transfer of capital among the countries involved (Koblitz 2010a). 14 For a comparison between Brazilian and Chinese support for emerging market multinationals, particularly regarding how the state policies encourage outward foreign direct investment as a domestic development strategy, see Masiero & Caseiro (2012) . 15 It should, however, be noticed that the internationalization of Brazilian companies has not been initiated during Lula´s government, and that the expansion of Brazilian multinationals is not a product of a governmental planning. Nevertheless, it has highly benefited from public policies after 2003 (Actis 2013, p. 23) 16 For a discussion about physical infrastructure projects as regional public goods, see Araque Botero (2012) . 17 Argentina has been one of the countries that most benefited from Brazilian infrastructure financing in South America (Koblitz, 2010a) . In the years 2009 and 2010, for instance, infrastructure projects in the country absorbed more than 50% of BNDES's loans to South America. The Brazilian bank possesses a financing portfolio especially for Argentina's infrastructure projects, which is divided in three areas: gas pipelines, transports and sanitation (Koblitz, 2010b) .
directions", as said by Burges (2007 Burges ( , p. 1350 (Friedlander & Tereza 2009 ). Besides, according to representatives of Brazilian industry, the bank has benefited only a few large enterprises, excluding small and medium firms (Pereira 2010) . There is also an important vector of criticism concerning social and/or environmental impacts of infrastructure projects, to say 18 As an example, Odebrecht is responsible for the insertion of circa 1.600 Brazilian suppliers of different sectors in several South American countries as well as in other continents (Gaio 2012, p.14) . It is not our aim to scrutinize these criticisms. As well explained by Actis (2012), Brazil's cooperation in South America envisages not only the region's development, but also Brazil's own development goals. The author adds that the expansion of Brazil's multinationals in the continent has been understood by Brazilian government as both an instrument of national development, and regional cooperation for boosting neighbors' countries development and infrastructure. Certainly, this difficult equilibrium between "development and solidarity", as coined by the author himself, brings considerable challenges to Brazil's cooperation and leadership in South America. According to Actis (2012) , however, "solidarity" has predominated over national interests and development goals when it comes to Brazil's foreign policy in the region.
We would like to add that although the benefits might also be private and to some extent asymmetrical between the partner-countries, the countries benefitted by the for instance, Odebrecht continues to be a major player in infrastructure projects, being 20 For more information on both cases, see Murakawa (2011; .
in charge of many and diverse public concessions (Pupo 2012 26 , it is still very difficult to find consolidated numbers that could allow us a more precise referencing. In face of this gap, the IberoAmerican General Secretary (SEGIB) has been making a formidable work through its annual reports on SSC, in monitoring the flow of financial resources inherent to these cooperative policies.
In this sense, according to an annual report launched by SEGIB, since 2010
Brazil has been the main responsible for cooperation projects in South America, when it exceeded the projects offered by Cuba and Venezuela, the leading countries in the offering of cooperation projects in 2009 (Xalma 2010 (Xalma , 2011 (Xalma , 2012 . In 2011, the country provided nearly 210 cooperation projects, followed by 120 projects provided by in South America. Concerning projects that envisaged services and infrastructure sectors, Brazil was responsible for 26 in a total of 69 projects. It is worth noting that, although Argentina also plays a relevant role in regional cooperation, the country only exceeds Brazil when it comes to cooperation actions, not cooperation projects.
According to the same report, cooperation actions such as seminars and short courses on professional capacitation are more punctual, less complex and less expensive than cooperation projects. Otherwise, cooperation projects tend to involve more costs and envisage the long term. In this sense, while cooperation projects tend to subsist for about a year and a half, cooperation actions normally last a little more than one month. Source: Authors' own compilation based on data provided by SEGIB (Xalma 2011) .
In As for Brazilian technical cooperation in the agriculture sector, it is important to note the relevant role of EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation), which has been involved in more than 70 cooperation projects in South America. It has been present in countries such as Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, Guyana, Colombia, Argentina, Suriname, Ecuador and Venezuela. Its programs cover diversified areas, like food and nutritional security, soybean production, fish farming, family farming, livestock orientation, cotton production, potato production and commercialization chains, among others Altogether, those projects materialize direct transfer of knowledge and expertise that have been generated and successfully implemented within Brazil (Burges 2012, p. 227 ). Moreover, they are good examples to illustrate the way by which Brazil was quite successful in crafting a kind of regional leading role able to bring, even if asymmetrically, economic and social benefits for both itself and its neighbors.
It is on this aspect that the Brazilian portfolio of cooperation in South America favors the spread of the Brazilian development model (Ayllón 2012, p. 198) , to the extent that it offers a cluster of experiences, public policies and knowledge of its own (Idem), as well as professional qualification. In doing so, Brazil cooperation projects for development bring with them a Brazilian view, a Brazilian expertise and a Brazilian modus operandi, and, therefore, it crafts a kind of leadership that we label Development
Regional Leadership
30 .
Despite all these and many other examples that bring a positive stance to Brazil Despite accepting the country's leading regional role for development (inwards regional leadership) derived from the credit lines for infrastructure projects and from the supply of expertise on capacity building by means of projects of technical cooperation, they do not take it as a passport for Brazil acting in their name outside the region 31 . In summary, it is possible to see that Brazil's regional peers tend to preserve 30 We have no doubts that Brazil is also being able to craft another kind of important leading role in the region -or inwards regional leadership, as we mentioned above -by means of attitudes towards political stability in the region, such as its role on the negotiations amongst Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela over the killing of a FARC leader by the Colombian armed forces within the Ecuadorian territory (VIEIRA & ALDEN, 2011:516); or on the Venezuelan crisis over the right of president Chavez taking office despite his illness. "Maduro: Dilma respalda decisão tomada por Judiciário". O Globo, 10 Jan. 2013, Available at: <http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/maduro-dilma-respalda-decisao-tomada-porjudiciario-7246902>. Accessed: 10 Jan. 2013. Nevertheless, in this chapter our aim is to highlight its role as a development leader in the region, in relation to which these actions cannot be taken as examples. 31 It is worth noting, that differently from the last contest for the position of director-general of the WTO (2009) when Uruguay presented its own candidate to run against the Brazilian one, in 2013 Brazil was the only South American country to run for the position. The Brazilian government and the WTO announced consensus over Brazil's candidate, Roberto Azevedo. In this sense, there was an agreement amongst all WTO members, including Brazilian regional peers, on Azevedo's candidacy. This could be seen as a signal that Brazil is succeeding to gain South American support and also as an indicator of the increasing international recognition of Brazil as a leading country on trade negotiations. their own positions in global matters despite their acquiescence to Brazil's prominent cooperation projects and infrastructure financing in the regional sphere. It is here that extra-regional/Southern coalitions (with partners from Asia and Africa), such as IBSA, have been helping Brazil to realize its global ambitions.
IV. Brazil and Southern coalitions for global protagonism
Created in 2003, the IBSA Forum (India/Brazil/South Africa Dialogue Forum) was conceived as a strategic partnership amongst emerging industrialized economies and democracies. Soon after its launching, the initiative was "transformed into a SouthSouth inter-state cooperation based largely on soft power assets (…) articulating common goals, positions and values in world politics and economics" (Hirst 2011, p. 3). 32 In 2004 In doing so IBSA became a special forum for advocacy for the developing world and could therefore be seen as a soft balancing strategy (Pape 2005) aiming to challenge 32 IBSA has a huge portfolio of agreements in very important issues such as international security, science and technology, health, education, agriculture, transport, etc. either as trilateral agreements or as collective proposals to be presented in the international fora for the reform of the present international regimes ruling these issues. 33 For more information about IBSA Fund see http://www.ibsatrilateral.org//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=40.
international norms, rules or practices that might adversely affect the interests of its members and -hopefully -to eventually change these norms. Amongst its achievements in coordinating positions on multilateral negotiations we can mention the negotiations at the WTO (Chakraborty & Sengupta 2006) 34 ; its continuous advocacy for a distinct approach to international cooperation for development 35 ; the joint project presented to the UN Human Rights Council about access to medicines and the right to medical treatment, the approval of which could be interpreted as an example of success of the political SS cooperation towards development (Ayllón 2012, p. 196) ; as well as the demands for a new regulation of transnational capital flows (Stephen 2012, p. 304) . 
V. Conclusion
During Lula's government, Brazilian diplomacy left behind the belief that for having global protagonism the country had to make use of South America as a regional launching platform. Put differently, Brazil did not play the regional card to achieve global aims. And this is so not because Brazil´s strategy towards the global arena had changed, but mainly because Brazilian regional aims were modified. In other words, Brazilian policy of giving priority towards South America was an objective in itself in the direction of a better relationship with its neighbors. As a matter of fact, by comparing the time when Brazil used to look at initiatives of regional integration such as Mercosur as a tool to enhance its role on global politics in a kind of regional-global duplicity performance (Pinheiro 2000, p. 327) should not see leadership as a comprehensive concept -that is, one that could cover all dimensions of a country's interests whichever the forum of discussion -nor as an instrument or credential for acting outside the regional sphere, but rather as the capacity to influence South American neighbors on matters of regional governance due to the outstanding impact that Brazilian "capacity development" 36 projects of international cooperation had on modeling regional development. It is worth noting that we are not talking about the victory of one kind of development model over its rivals 36 Brazil actually calls it as "cooperação estruturante para o desenvolvimento", which is a little different from UNDP's definition of capacity development. Whilst for Brazil the "cooperação estruturante para o desenvolvimento" means the construction of capacities for development by integrating the human resources formation, organizational strengthening, and institutional development, besides refusing to replicate the traditional unilateral transference of technologies; or "proyectos creadores de capacidades nacionales con impacto social y económico sobre los beneficiarios que movilizan agentes de varias áreas y aseguran más apropiación y sostenibilidad" (Ayllón 2012, p.200) ; or yet a kind of assistance based on a "structural" approach, that is, "a sustainable plan of action to reach long-term socioeconomic impact on the ground (HIRST, 20111:5); for UNDP, "capacity development" "builds on this evolution and has three cornerstones. It is a continuing learning and changing process. It emphasizes better use and empowerment of individuals and organizations. And it requires that systematic approaches be considered in devising capacity development strategies and programmes". UNDP-UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. (desenvolvimentismo over liberalism), but rather about one way of boosting regional development by means of credit lines for infrastructure projects as well as by means of public financing of technical cooperation projects that aim at economic stability and social progress in collective terms. Naturally, we are not unaware about the existence of competing ideological positions in the region as well as some level of opposition to the mode of development leadership searched by Brazil. Nevertheless, we state that despite some level of opposition and dispute, Brazil was able to maintain its leading position in the region both as an infrastructure projects provider of funds and as a pattern of how to make them feasible 37 .
The kind of leadership Brazil has performed was very much of a collaborative and distributive nature, to pick up two patterns of leadership mentioned by Tokatlian (2010) . It is so in the sense that Brasilia showed great inclination for sharing resources and for paying the costs for regional development and, in doing so, contributing for the social and economic development of neighbors in the name of a stronger regional stability and governance. Nevertheless, to say that Brazil was playing such a leading role on the regional sphere does not mean that the country did so devoid of interests. In other words, initiatives like those we cited above did help the country to enhance political links in the region and also brought benefits for Brazilian private investments, especially for the sectors which are brought to the scene as suppliers of goods and services, as well as for Brazilians living in South America countries (Spektor 2010, p. 36) . In doing so, two important consequences followed: firstly, Brazilian government helped some of its big companies to internationalize and, at the same time, contributed to provide regional public goods that helped to boost regional development; and secondly, the government succeeded in articulating private domestic and public external interests much better by promoting a domestic constituency for the continuation of this policy, though it also brought some level of dissatisfaction from sectors that did not benefit from the same policy, or from those who disagreed with the criteria used to choose the benefited companies (Masiero & Caseiro 2012, pp.30-31 On the other hand, despite the acceptance of Brazil's inwards regional leadership by its peers, Brazilian regional status could not be automatically taken as regional acceptance to lead those countries on global matters or to represent them before other countries or group of countries such as European Union. And it is in this sense that the IBSA forum could be seen as the other ambit of the Brazilian aims and strategy.
Since Brazil started to develop new kinds of coalitions, such as IBSA, BRICS, BASIC, there is no need to work on the regional level as a launching platform for global protagonism (Vaz 2012). The interstate coalitions of regional powers like IBSA are important tools for making feasible the articulation of emerging countries who share the same objective of changing the present pattern of international relations towards their economic and political ascendance, since they seem to be more adequate and indeed more efficient, without high costs of transaction. In this sense, at IBSA Brazil could strengthen its condition of regional power to act in global matters, benefiting from this situation, without having to search in advance for a certificate from its regional partners to be a regional leader Likewise, since Brazil has gained increasing global recognition and, therefore, it does not depend on a pre-regional endorsement to do so 39 , the regional links might also be beneficiaries of this situation. Indeed, it is not out of the question to think that this kind of intra-regional relationship without the expectation for trade-offs in global matters -either from Brazil as a paymaster or from the South American countries as beneficiaries -can indeed contribute to facilitate the relationship amongst Brazil and its neighbors, with possible positive results even for the debates at the global fora. In other words, to the extent that trade-offs are not put on the negotiation table, this relationship might slowly lead to a kind of recognition of Brazil's credentials to represent South 38 See Table I above. 39 This lack of dependency between traditional regional leadership and global performance can be exemplified by the fact that, even after its defeat as candidate for WTO general-director in 2009, due to the lack of regional supporters, Brazil´s reputation and influence in WTO has not been damaged (Malamud 2011, p.9) . Besides, we could also mention other Southern coalitions for specific issues of which Brazil is a member, in which the country -and perhaps also its partners -also benefits from its condition of regional power, without having to be a regional leader in its traditional meaning, such as BASIC (Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, created in early 2010 this coalition brings together Brazil, South Africa, India and China for matters of Climate Change;. G-4 -India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil -the articulation for the reform of the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC).
America in global fora 40 . But even if that does not happen in the future, Brazil has already presented itself as a regional development leader without -and definitely with no need for -bringing its neighbors to the global negotiation tables.
Before we finish this chapter, it is worth asking if Brazil has kept its role of Development Regional Leader after president Lula left the government. To answer that, we shall firstly take into account that during Lula´s government a great deal of initiatives were taken on the regional level, enough to put a high expectation on his successor -perhaps higher than we should. There are no doubts that president Dilma
Roussef has given continuity to the policies that gave Brazil a position of a Development Regional Leader, despite the fact that she has been in office for half of the period president Lula was, and moreover despite the economic restrictions that followed the 2008 financial crisis, which had a major impact on her government since the very begining. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid saying that she has been doing so in a more incremental way and in a less integrated policy towards the region. We thus see less activism from the state agencies and, as a consequence, a stronger presence of private and secondary actors acting in the region.
By way of conclusion, even if we cannot affirm for sure that Brazil can still be seen as an inwards regional leader during the current government of president Dilma
Roussef -and it is even more difficult to say if that will happen in the hypothesis of her being re-elected for a second term -, we argue that, during Lula´s government, Brazil should indeed be seen as such since its policy towards the region addressed the three determinants of leadership according to Van Langenhove and Zwartjes (2012): willingness to act as a leader, capacity to do so and acceptance by its neighbors.
40 It is not out of question the hypothesis that the support Brazil received from its regional peersArgentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Venezuela, among others -for the Brazilian candidacy to WTO general-director is an example of that. "Azevedo Rode To WTO Victory Mainly Due To Developing World Support". Available at: <http://wtonewsstand.com/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/menu-id-446.html
